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Data Mining ‘Problem Youth’: Looking Closer But Not Seeing Better 
 
ABSTRACT. This chapter examines how a Dutch city attempted to use data mining to 
profile ‘problem youth’. It challenges zooming as the metaphor that guides the use of 
this statistical technique. To see something from close by, it is argued, is a situated 
practice. Instead of presenting the object in more detail, a new object is brought into 
being. Two modes of situated improvisation are identified. These involve the interplay 
of artefacts, bodies of knowledge, and normativities. Attending to metaphors in 
practice may thus be a useful starting point to change the terms by which digital 
identities are produced.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
In 2011, the Dutch municipality of Burgcity conducted a pilot study about data 
mining. It aimed to find out whether this statistical technique could be used to 
improve its understanding of ‘problem youth’, loosely defined by the city as youth 
below twenty-three years of age who are likely to commit minor offences such as 
vandalism, littering or shop theft.1 In particular, it aimed to learn whether a 
combination of municipal data, police data and commercial data about consumption 
could lead to new insights for youth crime policy.  
 Especially salient in this pilot study was the policy makers’ use of the 
metaphor of ‘zooming in’. The policy makers expected data mining to provide 
knowledge that was local, particular and timely. This understanding of data mining is 
not unique to Burgcity. Indeed, proponents of data mining promise increased detail 
and granularity. As was stated in a project plan, data mining techniques would 
generate “local theories” that “the general theories of social science” cannot provide.  
 Vision metaphors are never innocent, however, as Donna Haraway has 
famously argued (1991). The metaphor of zooming draws on the imagery of a 
mechanical lens, which reveals more detail about an object. The resulting ‘close-ups’ 
are assumed to have a high truth status because of their implied precision. In this 
chapter, I am interested in how digital data are put to use according to a rationale of 
zooming in to profile problem youth. Profiles can be understood as identities that are 
ascribed to youth and used a basis for government intervention (Pridmore, this 
volume).  
 I aim to challenge zooming as an underlying principle in data mining practices 
and scholarly and professional accounts. I do so because sticking to this metaphor 
                                                 
1 My informants used ‘problem youth’ and ‘at risk youth’ intertwiningly. To avoid confusion, I will 
only refer to ‘problem youth’. Although I will henceforth use the term without quotation marks, I 
emphasize that it is by no means a natural category and that applying this category can negatively 
affect individuals and groups (see Bowker and Star 1999). Some of my informants shared this view. 
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risks mobilization of data mining in an argument for the acquisition of ever more 
personal data. Namely, if a technology by itself can provide ever more detailed 
representations of youth, all it needs are more or better data. Furthermore, the 
metaphor obscures the normativities that are part of the practice of data mining. With 
this I mean that it diverts attention from the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ that come into play 
when ‘detailed knowledge’ is produced. 
 My questions are how zooming in was done in the Burgcity data mining pilot 
and what norms were embedded in and produced through these practices. I attend to 
the bodies of knowledge, discursive practices and artefacts that were part of zooming 
in. Adopting a material-semiotic approach, I focus on the heterogeneous relations that 
bring objects, such as problem youth, into being (Mol 2002; M'charek 2013). From 
this approach, it follows that by zooming in one does not simply see the same thing in 
more detail. Instead, the practices of zooming in bring new objects into being 
(Strathern, 2005). I draw on Charles Goodwin’s work to describe data miners’ 
practices as ‘situated improvisation’ (1995; 1996). 
This chapter is based on fieldwork that I conducted before, during and after 
the Burgcity pilot for a period of eighteen months. I focus on the interactive sessions 
at the core of the pilot, in which policy makers and corporate experts analysed the 
data. We will follow the participants through various attempts to zoom in. First, from 
zooming in to the level of the sub-city district, we learn about two modes of situated 
improvisation the participants engaged in: evocation and comparison. Second, from 
zooming in to the level of the neighbourhood we learn from the trouble that the 
participants ran into: they could not zoom in any further without losing sight of the 
problem youth. This part if the pilot draws out the regimes of evidence that are part of 
zooming in.  
Attending to the practicalities of zooming in also allows us to learn that it is 
normative work. I show that results needed to be made relevant as surprises; that the 
‘lens’ focused on the neighbourhood as a source for truth; that city youth were 
constituted as a norm; that detail is produced by the application of general categories; 
and that zooming in includes making judgements about good knowledge for 
government. These normativities suggest that taking seriously the metaphors by which 
technologies are brought into practice might be a good starting point to change the 
terms by which digital identities are produced.  
 
 
Zooming In as Situated Improvisation 
 
Mining for Local Knowledge 
 
Ever more digital data are available for analysis. People produce increasing amounts 
of data through activities as simple as browsing on the internet and using a chip card 
on public transport. This development is joined by a growing capacity to search and 
analyse these data. Data mining is a statistical technique often used for the analysis of 
big datasets. It is commonly referred to as “the automatic or semi-automatic process 
of discovering patterns in data” (Witten, Eibe, and Hall 2011, 5), or “the application 
of specific algorithms for extracting patterns” (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, and Smyth 
1996, 39). In everyday usage, it can refer to both software and analytical skills.  
Data mining is argued to challenge traditional science, because, in contrast 
with statistical techniques such as regression analysis, the software allows the analyst 
to search for relations in the data without defining hypotheses and limiting the number 
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of variables in advance (Witten, Eibe, and Hall 2011; Hildebrandt 2008). Instead, an 
algorithm is applied to automatically find co-occurrences in a large dataset that can 
comprise thousands of variables.2 Industry therefore advertises data mining as 
‘digging’ into the data to find ‘nuggets of gold’ (yet other metaphors).   
It needs to be noted that, although data mining provides analysts with new 
possibilities, it is often practiced as a combination of old and new statistical 
techniques. In the application studied in this chapter, for instance, conventional 
geodemographic marketing techniques are combined with data mining algorithms.3 
Furthermore, in practice, patterns are often not found automatically, but rely on the 
expert’s insight to choose variables (Ang and Goh 2011). Following boyd and 
Crawford, it therefore seems appropriate to approach data mining not as a “higher 
form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously 
impossible”, but as a mythology as well as a technological development (2012, 663).  
 In policy practice, data mining is most often used to create profiles: sets of 
correlations that can be used to identify or represent individuals or groups 
(Hildebrandt 2008, 19). It is applied in a variety of policy domains, such as anti-
terrorism programs, programs against tax evasion, welfare policy and, as this chapter 
describes, local crime policy. In these cases, the promise of data mining is specificity: 
more data and diverse data sources generate a closer view. Policy makers are seldom 
interested in general patterns, policy ethnographies show (Choy 2005; Yanow 2002). 
They are in search of particularities, and commercial data mining is brought in for this 
purpose. This is also reflected in the marketing analytics industry, which has 
specialized in the provision of ever more locally specific knowledge (Phillips and 
Curry 2003). 
 Empirical scholarly work on the use of data mining and large datasets by 
(local) policy agencies mainly describes the limitations of data mining. It is argued 
that digital data do not necessarily lead to descriptions of individuals and groups that 
are more precise. In Gary T. Marx’s words, users of this technology “see hazily (but 
not darkly) through the lens” (2005, 339). A fundamental reason is that profiles give 
very little information about individuals and small groups of people since they 
aggregate data. The characteristics of the profile may therefore not be applicable to all 
the individuals it represents (Curry 2004; also see Custers 2004). It is also argued that 
the data do not represent individuals correctly because government datasets are often 
incomplete or simply wrong (Pleace 2007). Moreover, not all types of large datasets 
are valuable or reliable. This is the case for some social media data, such as 
statements on Twitter (boyd and Crawford 2012). In acquiring data, furthermore, local 
governments are limited by privacy restrictions. An example is the use of police data. 
Lastly, the possibilities of acquiring commercial datasets are often limited for 
financial reasons and because companies are not always allowed or willing to share 
them (boyd and Crawford 2012; Pleace 2007).  
 
 
Localized and Embodied Visions 
 
                                                 
2 In Burgcity, Data Inc. applied a nearest-neighbour associative algorithm. This algorithm is understood 
to be suitable for a wide variety of practical applications because it allows for the analysis of databases 
with many missing values.  
3 Some would argue that this is not ‘real’ data mining. In using the term data mining I adopt my 
informants’ terminology.  
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These considerations put data mining into perspective. The reason I raise them here, 
however, is because they bring to mind a similar issue in anthropology. In Partial 
Connections (2005), Marilyn Strathern identifies the problem that there never seems 
to be sufficient data to adequately describe social life. Whenever one looks closer or 
from another angle there still does not seem to be enough data. One would expect 
complexity to decrease when a smaller part of society is examined; instead, there 
always seems to be something new to discover. The similarity between these two 
practices – data mining and anthropological observation – is that they are both based 
on the premise that seeing better requires more or better data.  
 Strathern takes issue with the idea that there are an infinite number of 
perspectives, each requiring more data. She argues that all perspectives exist as 
“localized, embodied visions” (40). These visions do not present different versions of 
reality, but enact the object in different, partially connected ways (also see Mol 2002). 
To change perspective, therefore, does not amount to seeing part of a whole. For 
zooming in this means that one does not see a part of the same object in more detail. 
When scientists, professional analysts, policy makers or others zoom in, they bring an 
object into being.  
This is a relevant distinction because it avoids the notion that technologies by 
themselves reveal the characteristics of populations that exist independently of the 
practices by which they are mapped (M'charek 2005; Ruppert 2011). This notion of 
technology is problematic in academic discourse because it feeds into the idea that 
lack of data or analytical power obstructs perfect close visions. It therefore fails to 
question data mining in terms other than those of an information problem. I suggest 
examining how zooming in is done in practice in order to overcome this limitation.  
 
 
Situated Improvisations 
 
To be sure, to insist on a critical attitude towards metaphors of vision is not new.4 
Donna Haraway is especially known for her contribution to this project. In Situated 
Knowledges (1991), she argues that, with contemporary visualizing technologies, 
“Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective gives 
way to infinitely mobile vision, which no longer seems just mythically about the god-
trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary 
practice” (189). Claims for scientific objectivity are based on a ‘view from nowhere’, 
thus creating a science that is detached and totalizing. What is needed, Haraway 
argues, is a commitment to situated knowledges: knowledges that are understood as 
local, embodied and partial.   
  Inspired by this body of work, Christopher Gad and Peter Lauritsen (2009) 
suggest that social scientists with an interest in surveillance practices such as digital 
identification should study them as situated phenomena. To observe something, actors 
in the field of surveillance need to draw together bodies of knowledge, artefacts and 
human actors at a certain place and time. Surveilled objects thus achieve their status in 
terms of the relations between heterogeneous entities (M'charek 2013).  
 I use this notion of situatedness to study zooming in as a metaphor comparable 
to Haraway’s vision metaphor of ‘seeing everything from nowhere’. Goodwin’s work 
                                                 
4 Surveillance Studies has had its own issues with the Panopticon, a model for visual surveillance that 
Michel Foucault (1994 [1975]) adopted as a theoretical model (see for instance Lyon (2006)). In this 
chapter, I am less concerned with theoretical models in social science, and more with knowledge 
practices.  
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about situated improvisations (1995) provides a point of departure for understanding 
how the participants of the Burgcity pilot zoomed in on youth. Goodwin coined the 
term to describe how an object of knowledge emerges through the interplay of 
screens, common knowledge, lay theories, everyday artefacts and professional 
repertoires (606). Importantly, with improvisation I do not refer to random actions, 
but to actions that are informed by bodies of knowledge, artefacts and emerging 
priorities at a certain place and time.  
 Following Goodwin, I will attend to talk and gestures by which the relations 
between these heterogeneous entities were achieved. For instance, Goodwin describes 
how marine biologists highlighted the information presented to them on a screen by 
pointing at it with a pencil or by making comments such as “that nice feature again” 
(262). In his work on archaeology, he shows that some of the talk makes some results 
more relevant than others; it sets out the conditions of relevance (1996). Furthermore, 
from Goodwin’s analysis of the Rodney King trial we learn that some actors may use 
the status of their profession to influence enquiries. This is what he refers to as 
professional privilege (1996). 
 
 
Data Mining Problem Youth: A Pilot Study 
 
Marketing Intelligence Methods 
 
Burgcity is a medium sized Dutch city of about two hundred thousand inhabitants. 
The pilot study took place at the Department of Community safety, which employed 
sixteen persons at the time I was present. Data Inc. is a data analyst company 
employing no more than ten persons. It had mainly accepted assignments from the 
Dutch police force and corporations in the Netherlands. Data Inc. provided the 
software, collected and cleaned the data, and performed the analyses.   
The case description and the case study that follow are based on observations 
of the pilot meetings, the city’s policy makers’ everyday routines, and interviews. As 
the reader might suspect, Burgcity and Data Inc. are fictitious names, as are the names 
of all other organizations, places and persons mentioned in this chapter (with the 
exception of the international corporation that delivered the commercial data used in 
this pilot: Experian). I agreed to anonymity because confidential information 
regarding suspects, their backgrounds and crime control practices often passed my 
eyes on the Burgcity work floor. I also agreed because I felt a responsibility to protect 
the livelihood of my informants. I believe that this is an especially sensitive issue 
because both the company and the city were involved in an experimental activity, 
making themselves vulnerable as they treaded uncertain ground.5  
The pilot study’s aim, as stated in Data Inc.’s project proposal, was to develop 
“more efficient and effective approaches”6 to non-criminal nuisance and minor 
criminal offences committed by youth. The use of the Experian dataset, which 
contains ‘lifestyle data’, was advertised as the pilot’s main innovative feature. 
‘Marketing intelligence methods’ were to lead to new insights into problem youth, 
their life worlds and motivations. If one knows that the “most troublesome youth” 
wear Nikes, a new approach in policy might be to involve Nike stores in a campaign 
against vandalism, one of the project’s initiators argued in a 2010 presentation. 
                                                 
5 For this reason I have chosen not to include the full titles of the policy documents that I cite in the 
bibliography. Instead, I mention the document types in the text.  
6 All fieldwork quotes have been translated from Dutch by the author. 
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The Experian lifestyle dataset incorporates about fifteen hundred variables on 
basic information about household income and age; interests and activities, such as 
membership to a sports club; and media usage, such as internet usage and newspaper 
subscriptions. These variables also include pre-set profiles, referred to as Mosaic 
groups, such as ‘free spirits’, ‘mini machos’ or ‘digital families’. The data come from 
sources such as property or telephone registrations and surveys. Experian datasets are 
sold for marketing purposes, to develop strategies for the collection of bills and debts, 
and to manage financial risk.  
These data were combined with police data about suspects and offences and 
with municipality data including variables such as age, income and school attendance.  
A remark about the police dataset is in order here. It contains records about 
individuals suspected of one or more offences. Even if police investigation has 
pointed out that an individual was not involved in an incident, he or she remains 
registered. For the purposes of the pilot, young suspects were used as an 
approximation of problem youth, which raises the obvious issue of whether these data 
can really help Burgcity to learn about the group it is interested in.   
Data mining was expected to help the city understand problems more 
“thoroughly and quickly”, understand patterns that characterize problem youth at 
neighbourhood level, identify the groups that need attention, and identify and 
influence causal relations. Thus, it would allow the city’s policy makers to “zoom in” 
on local youth and generate “local theories” (Interview, former CEO Data Inc., 
November 12, 2010). In policy maker Anna’s words, it could be another method to 
“reach out” to Burgcity’s inhabitants (Interview, September 5, 2011).7 
 
 
Pilot Results 
 
Prior to the pilot, Burgcity’s Department of Community Safety had already 
considered data mining to improve the city’s ‘information position’. As the 
department’s information specialist put it, “data mining is definitely going to happen 
in Burgcity, there is no doubt about it. The head of our department asks me how data 
mining is coming along every week” (Interview, April 21, 2011). So, when the 
department head was asked by an innovation platform to participate in the pilot, he 
consented. The funding was supplied by a grant from the Dutch Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. 
The innovation platform chose to focus on problem youth, which was and still 
is a hot topic in Dutch crime policy. Next, it was up to Burgcity to select a case study. 
It chose its newest and demographically youngest city district, Molendistrict, as a case 
study. Molendistrict has about forty thousand inhabitants. The district seemed to suit 
the purposes of the pilot because one third of Burgcity’s youth lives here and 
nuisances in the area are of considerable concern for the city’s staff at the Department 
of Community Safety.  
 Data Inc. insisted that the policy makers’ input was crucial to asses which 
results were of value for Molendistrict. Three of Burgcity’s civil servants were 
involved in the pilot: Mieke, Anna and Liesbet. Mieke is the department’s information 
specialist, Anna the department’s specialist on youth, and Liesbet the district manager 
of Molendistrict. The group would ideally explore the possibilities of the software 
                                                 
7 The participants focused on finding patterns. They did not aim to introduce an automated signal.   
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together to learn what insights could be gained by using it. Data Inc. suggested taking 
an “iterative approach”, whereby Burgcity’s policy makers would formulate 
questions, find answers and “learn how to ask better questions” (Fieldwork notes, 
February 28, 2011).8 
 Next to preparatory and strategic meetings, the city’s civil servants and 
Juriaan, Data Inc.’s analyst, met four times for interactive sessions in Burgcity’s city 
hall. During these sessions, Juriaan operated a laptop and the city employees faced 
him. Everybody in the small meeting rooms could see the computer interface on an 
LCD screen. During the meetings, a question for analysis would be formulated by the 
policy makers or by Juriaan. Juriaan would then attempt to answer the question, 
showing the results on the screen. 
Three types of results were generated. First, frequency tables presented counts, 
for example, the number of suspects living in each neighbourhood. Second, profile 
analysis was used to compare two or more populations. The resulting table displayed 
the variables for which significant differences between the populations were found. 
Third, the data mining system was used to generate ‘hotspot’ maps: clusters of 
offences committed in a certain location on the map.  
 The pilot did not result in a set of stable and generally acknowledged 
conclusions about problem youth and youth crime policy. Data Inc. did present a 
number of conclusions in the final report, amongst others about the types of 
neighbourhoods that have a relatively high risk of youth delinquency, such as 
neighbourhoods in which household income varies strongly (Data Inc. 2012, internal 
document). In the end, however, the report stated that it could not characterize 
problem youth using the lifestyle data due to privacy restrictions (on which I will 
elaborate later in the chapter).  
 In what follows, I describe how zooming in was done and what bodies of 
knowledge and objects informed the efforts to obtain a closer view. I attempt to 
understand how, once the results had been presented on the screen, a close view of 
youth “emerged through the interplay between a domain of scrutiny (…) [and] a set of 
discursive practices (…), being deployed with a specific activity” (Goodwin 1996, 
606). Two themes that regularly returned in the sessions are presented to the reader: 
the place of residence of youth that commit offences in Molendistrict and the use of 
lifestyle data to characterize youth that commit offences. I have chosen to elaborate 
on these themes because they were discussed most frequently and thoroughly during 
the sessions, and therefore are the most instructive about the practice of zooming in. 
For each of these themes, I focus on the participation of one of the policy makers.  
 
 
Zooming In from City to District  
 
Surprise 
 
The first story is about Liesbet’s question for the technology. It demonstrates the 
particularities of zooming in from the city to the district level.9 Liesbet is the district 
manager for Molendistrict. It is her job to facilitate communication between the 
central city and Molendistrict’s local politicians, interest groups and case workers. As 
                                                 
8 This process is referred to as the CRISP-DSM method, see Custers (2004).  
9 The levels that my informants worked with are, from high to low: city, (sub-city) district, postal code, 
neighbourhood, sub-neighbourhood, postal code-6 (about twenty households), individual.  
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she puts it, she defends the district’s interests at city level. Of all the participants in 
the pilot, she visits the district most frequently. 
 This is what data mining should answer for Liesbet: “Where in Molendistrict 
do the young people who commit offences live? And how can useful policies be 
developed for youth who commit offences in Molendistrict but live in other districts?” 
(Data Inc., internal document, June 18, 2010). These questions require zooming in. It 
is necessary to look closer, she explains, because, although she is familiar with the 
area and its inhabitants, it is difficult to learn about the causes of youth crime. 
Statistics, she argues, often obscure local circumstances because they aggregate data. 
Furthermore, because the neighbourhood is relatively new (construction started in the 
early 1980s), she feels that the social networks that should theoretically help her to 
stay informed do not yet exist.  
 To find the answer to Liesbet’s question, Juriaan starts out by producing a 
frequency table about Molendistrict. A frequency table is a basic list that presents the 
number of occurrences in a query.  
 
Liesbet, Mieke and Anna take a good look at the results presented on the LCD 
screen. It shows a list of numbers: the number of young suspects in 
Molendistrict, broken down by neighbourhood. “Neighbourhood H, this 
surprises me,” Liesbet says. “Neighbourhood K makes sense because it has a 
shopping mall. But neighbourhood H is only a small residential area.”  
Anna asks her to show neighbourhood H on the map on the wall. 
Liesbet points at it: “There it is, the park is also part of it, nowadays.” “Is there 
a sports park nearby?” Anna wonders. This is not the case, but Liesbet notes 
that there is a swimming pool in the area.  
Anna has another suggestion: perhaps these are conflicts between 
neighbours? “No, not in neighbourhood H,” Liesbet replies, “this is not a 
neighbourhood known for fights between neighbours.” Next, Liesbet wants to 
know more about neighbourhood H: “This is making me curious, what types 
of offences were committed here?” (Fieldwork notes, April 7, 2011)10 
 
This tells us that not all results count. A result counts when it is surprising, as in the 
case of neighbourhood H. Surprise, in Goodwin’s terms, is a condition of relevance 
for data mining. A close view is a view that is revealing. It provides a look under the 
surface.  
 
 
Evoking 
 
The group returns to the question of problem youth’s place of residence at the end of 
the meeting. This time they take a different approach. To learn more about the 
questions that neighbourhood H raises, they need to know more about the registered 
suspects. Therefore, Juriaan creates a frequency table that shows information about 
the suspects for offences committed in Molendistrict. This table is different from the 
previous one because it does not present youth living in Molendistrict but youth that 
have committed an offence there.  
 
                                                 
10 The interactive meetings could not be recorded due to the sensitive nature of the data. The quotations 
from these meetings are based on notes that were typed out within forty-eight hours of the meetings.  
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Many of the young suspects come from other districts, Liesbet notes. She 
points at the map: “Neighbourhood G, this is quite far away, it is in another 
district.” But “distance is not so important to youth,” she adds. Juriaan agrees: 
“Youth have a large radius of activity.” They look a little longer at the list. 
“These are neighbourhoods with a lot of social housing,” Liesbet notes. 
“Indeed, one of these neighbourhoods is a weak neighbourhood,” Juriaan adds. 
(Fieldwork notes, April 7, 2011) 
 
So, youth travel from other places to Molendistrict. They might come from 
neighbourhoods in other districts with fewer facilities, the group adds, and when they 
come to Molendistrict they cause a nuisance.  
 This is the type of account that was often generated in this pilot: propositions, 
statements, descriptions and explanations that loosely hang together. An important 
part of producing an account of Molendistrict’s suspects is ‘evocation’; the data needs 
to come to life and make sense, to be made ‘tellable’ (see also Curry 2004; Ziewitz 
2011). This first of all required maps. During the same session described in the first 
fragment above, Anna asks Liesbet to show neighbourhood H on the paper map on the 
wall. Almost every meeting room has one of these maps. They are large, about one 
and a half meters by one meter, and detailed. They show the borders of the districts 
and neighbourhoods as designated by the Dutch central government (National 
Statistics Netherlands or CBS). 
 The map displays what the screen does not: the borders between 
neighbourhoods, the distances between the neighbourhoods, and a detailed street plan. 
The data mining software can plot the results on a digital map, but this is an oblique 
map: it does not show borders and specificities. The detailed paper map helps Liesbet 
locate the neighbourhood and tie it to her previous experiences: for instance, 
neighbourhood H is not known for conflicts between neighbourhoods. Maps also help 
to fill in the particulars of the neighbourhood. They show whether there is a park 
nearby, or a shopping mall. Furthermore, they show distances, revealing that youth 
travel. So pointing at a map is part of bringing the data to life. 
 The second, and related, part of making the data come to life is to tie the 
results to policy theories, categories and local knowledge. This might be policy’s 
equivalent of what Mariana Valverde refers to as administrative knowledge in legal 
practices: “in-between knowledge” used by officials that is neither scientific nor lay 
(Valverde 2003, 20). By talking through these policy theories, categories and local 
knowledges, the results on the screen are pieced together. For instance, neither the 
frequency tables nor the maps give information about social housing, yet the policy 
officers apply this characteristic to the area on the map. Subsequently, they apply the 
notion that neighbourhoods with social housing are poorer, and poorer 
neighbourhoods are more troublesome. Juriaan’s additional remark about ‘weak 
neighbourhoods’, moreover, pieces the account together. He refers to the forty 
neighbourhoods that the national government has pointed out as the most problematic 
in the country in 2007 (also known as Vogelaarwijken). 
 My point here is not that the city’s knowledge base is not ‘scientific’ enough. 
Policy practitioners need at hand knowledge to do their jobs. Rather, I argue that this 
mode of improvisation shows that producing such accounts under the banner of more 
granularity introduces more general categories. In this example, moreover, a 
neighbourhood category invokes judgments about youth behaviour.  
 This is also relevant for the outcome of these sessions: namely, that youth who 
commit offences in Molendistrict are not from Molendistrict but from other, ‘bad’ 
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neighbourhoods. This outcome was partly informed by local politics. At the time of 
the pilot, Liesbet was involved in a discussion about the construction of new facilities 
in Molendistrict, such as practice rooms and bars. The dominant notion was that more 
facilities would help to reduce complaints about youth behaviour, as youth could 
engage in more activities. Liesbet reasoned that facilities might in fact cause more 
complaints because problem youth would come from other places to use them.  
 
 
Comparing  
 
At the next meeting, the group returns to the theme of the Molendistrict suspects. The 
question is how neighbourhoods within Molendistrict differ. Juriaan performs a 
‘profile analysis’ – a comparison between young suspects living in Molendistrict 
neighbourhoods with all inhabitants of the district. He states: 
 
Now we see that of all persons we are looking at, all 772 [registered suspects 
aged twenty-three and younger], 5.3 per cent lives in neighbourhood K. Of all 
Molendistrict inhabitants, 3.4 per cent lives in neighbourhood K. This is a 
difference, but not dramatically so. The difference in percentage is 1.9. 
(Fieldwork notes, April 26, 2011) 
 
Not everything counts as a surprise. From Juriaan’s quote above, we learn that 
surprise also comes with difference. Neighbourhood youth need to be distinguished 
from district youth.  
 Comparison is another mode of situated improvisation, next to evocation. In 
order to zoom in one needs to find a difference. This is built into Data Inc.’s software 
as ‘profile analysis’. As with evocation, however, the results on the screen do not 
make sense by themselves. This is an instance in which the pilot’s participants aimed 
to zoom in from city to district:  
 
Juriaan is asked to compare young suspects living in Molendistrict with 
suspects living in the city as a whole. First, the results on the screen show that 
seventeen per cent of the Molendistrict group is suspected of vandalism, 
against eleven per cent in the city. “So it must be the case that city youth 
commit different types of offences, whereas Molendistrict youth mostly 
commit vandalism,” Liesbet argues.  
 Next, Juriaan turns to the absolute numbers. He shows that there were 
about 7,000 young suspects in Burgcity in 2007-2010, of which about 600 
suspects live in Molendistrict. Juriaan asks Liesbet for the total number of 
inhabitants. Liesbet answers that 40,000 people live in the district, compared 
to 200,000 in the city. “So the city is only five times as big, while the number 
of suspects is about ten times larger.” This means that, relatively, 
Molendistrict youth are not that bad, Juriaan concludes. (Fieldwork notes, 
April 7, 2011) 
 
The issue of size is central in this fragment and Liesbet’s knowledge of the numbers is 
basic, but crucial. In this case, comparison serves to estimate the size of the problem 
of Molendistrict youth delinquency. Interestingly, the group concludes that the 
problem of youth delinquency is relatively small. 
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 At other times, a paper map was used to compare. Liesbet was not always sure 
of the neighbourhoods’ sizes in terms of numbers of inhabitants, but a map could be 
used to estimate the geographical size. In the one meeting in which no maps were 
present, Anna got up, walked to the whiteboard and drew a map for Juriaan. She did 
so to demonstrate to Juriaan the relatively large size of a neighbourhood compared to 
the district as a whole.  
The two modes of improvisation, evocation and comparison, indicate that the 
results on the screen did not establish close views on their own. Part of the work of 
zooming in only started when the results had appeared on the screen. It was done by 
applying professional and everyday knowledges and reading paper maps. Problem 
youth therefore, was by no means an identity established by algorithms alone. 
Zooming in, moreover, was normative work. First, the use of maps in this 
section draws attention to a, perhaps obvious, characteristic of this practice: the idea 
of formal neighbourhoods as units for policy. Consequently, the nature of 
magnification is geographical; it focuses on a magnification of neighbourhood 
processes. This is telling, as income or educational levels could have also served as 
focal points for zooming in. Instead, the project group focused on the physical and 
spatial characteristics of the neighbourhood, such as facilities.  
 Neighbourhoods are taken to be the determining factor in many urban 
processes, and the neighbourhood is central in policy practice in the Netherlands as a 
whole, as exemplified by national programs that focus on ‘weak neighbourhoods’.  
This focus on the neighbourhood derives from an era of social science in which it was 
also a marker of social class. As David Phillips and Michael R. Curry note, it brings 
into practice the notion that “you are where you live” (2003, 143). The latter was 
especially true for the Burgcity policy makers, as they were not only looking for 
pragmatic information to sell products, but they wanted “deeper information” to “get 
close to youth” (Interview, November 15, 2010).  
 Second, through comparison the entity representing the ‘whole’ is constituted 
as the norm. So when Molendistrict youth are compared to city youth, the city is the 
norm. In this case, Molendistrict’s deviation from the norm was positive: the problem 
of youth delinquency was, comparatively speaking, relatively small.   
 
 
Zooming In to Neighbourhoods 
 
Lifestyle Analysis: A Discovery 
 
For Anna, the city’s policy specialist on youth, results on district level are not specific 
enough. She wants to know what characterizes problem youth in specific 
neighbourhoods. This closer view of problem youth, however, was never established 
in the pilot study. In fact, Data Inc. finally suggested zooming out in order to zoom in.  
 Anna participated in the meetings as the city’s project’s manager. Her main 
concern was to find out whether the software could be of added value to policy. Her 
point of departure was ‘the funnel model’ (Interview, July 18, 2011; Burgcity 2012, 
internal document). According to this model, twenty per cent of all youth is in the 
lower end of the funnel’s cone; these youth are at risk of committing an offence. The 
four per cent in the tip of the cone is out of the police’s and government’s reach. 
Anna’s aim was to find proactive approaches for this four per cent.  
 To this end, Anna contributes the following question to the pilot study: “What 
types of problem youth can be found in the neighbourhoods in terms of combinations 
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of characteristics and behaviour?” (Data Inc., June 18, 2010, internal document). This 
question is to be answered with the lifestyle data. During the meetings, Anna poses 
her question with some humour: “Do girls that read Tina [a Dutch teen magazine] set 
fire to litterbins more often?” On April 26, 2011, the group finally discovers 
something:  
 
Partly joking, Anna introduces what has been her main question for the past 
few meetings: “Which offences do girls that read Tina commit? Or, in other 
words, can we find a relation between offences and the Mosaic [Experian] 
data?” When Juriaan does not reply straight away, she rephrases the question: 
“So can you say that people who own a Jaguar or whose parents own a Jaguar 
are guilty of different offences than youth whose parents drive a mini?”  
 Juriaan’s first step in generating an answer to this question is to find 
the characteristics that distinguish young suspects in Molendistrict from all 
inhabitants of Burgcity. He presents a long list of characteristics that 
differentiate these youth on the LCD screen. We only see the characteristics 
for which the difference is statistically significant. Strong correlations with 
high values are shown at the top of the list; weak correlations are at the 
bottom. Among the latter are the Experian lifestyle variables.  
 Anna and her colleagues had been waiting for Juriaan to use the 
lifestyle data, so quite excitedly they ask him to scroll down. Suddenly Anna 
exclaims: “The sport darts! Yes, so the pilot is a success!” (Fieldwork notes, 
April 26, 2011) 
 
Anna finds what she is looking for: an association between lifestyle and youth crime 
and nuisance. To be sure, she does not believe this relation to be causal. In fact, the 
nature of the relationship is not relevant to her. But if it would be possible to find a 
‘segment’ of Molendistrict problem youth that could be located in a darts club, that 
reads Tina, or whose fathers drive Jaguars, she would know how to reach them 
(Interview, November 15, 2010). 
 In the meeting, Anna continues to discuss how these findings could be used to 
inform policy. She reasons that, on the basis of these and similar patterns on the 
neighbourhood level, one could initiate a marketing campaign. One could address 
darts associations, for instance, to reduce vandalism. Anna does not expect this 
approach to lead to drastic reductions of vandalism rates; however, if offences would 
decrease from one hundred to eighty incidents, this would be a satisfactory result. 
“We can ask a marketing intern whether this is a useful tool for a communicative 
government,” Anna concludes (Fieldwork notes, April 26, 2011).  
 
 
How Surprise Disappeared 
 
Anna’s discovery did not make it to the end report. When I asked Juriaan about it 
shortly after the pilot group’s last meeting, he did not remember the finding. In fact, 
Juriaan had discarded it soon after its discovery, arguing that there were simply not 
enough young suspects living in the individual Molendistrict neighbourhoods to 
perform such an analysis. 
 There was an additional problem. The police had not granted the project group 
access to the names and individual addresses of the young suspects due to privacy 
restrictions. This was a problem because the lifestyle information needed to be related 
12 
 
to the suspects on the basis of residential address, while the police had only provided 
information about the neighbourhoods these youth live in. The lifestyle data therefore 
also needed to be aggregated to neighbourhood level.11 Accordingly, a correlation 
between darts and registered suspects only meant that a number of people played darts 
in the suspects’ neighbourhood; it did not mean that the suspects actually played darts 
themselves.  
 Anna was disappointed. Not only were the results statistically significant, but 
in a previous meeting one of Juriaan’s Data Inc. colleagues had argued that even if a 
difference in terms of lifestyle data was found on the basis of only four suspects in 
one neighbourhood and ten in another, this could be an interesting lead for a policy 
maker. Even though the numbers are small, the difference between four and ten is 
telling, so this analyst argued.  
 There were two ways in which using small numbers as a basis for policy were 
discussed. The first of these comes from the world of marketing. As Juriaan 
explained:  
 
Well, in marketing, it’s like this … When you are flyering, for instance, it is 
about making very small differences. So if you start a campaign that leads to a 
difference [in sales] of one per cent in one neighbourhood and 0.7 per cent in 
the other … you could say this is insignificant but it actually is a very good 
result. (Fieldwork notes, February 28, 2011) 
 
Marketing had inspired Anna to think about lifestyles in the first place. To Juriaan she 
responded: “It is the same for us, really. I mean, even if one person is prevented from 
becoming a suspect or a criminal, this would be a welcome result.” In terms of the 
darts club example, even if just one person matched the darts profile, this could be 
interesting. 
 The second way in which the use of small numbers as evidence for policy was 
discussed comes from policing. In detective practices, a difference between four and 
ten provides a ‘lead’, It means that one has a starting point for investigation. For 
instance, if the profile for pickpocketing is a tennis player that reads glossy 
magazines, a detective can start investigating tennis clubs.  
 At work here are ‘professional regimes of evidence’ (Kahn 2013): professional 
standards for the type of evidence acceptable as a basis for intervention. In this case, 
the regime of evidence for policy had not yet crystallized. Juriaan, in his role as 
analytical expert, had final decision making power over the acceptability of the 
regimes of evidence that were applied. In other words, he had the professional 
privilege (Goodwin 1996) to decide on this, as he stated in the final pilot project 
meeting:  
 
Bart: So what about interventions, as in the Tina example?  
 
Juriaan: Well, if we are talking about a neighbourhood of 300-800 people, and 
maximum five per cent are registered suspects, should one start a campaign? 
(Fieldwork notes, September 26, 2011) 
 
                                                 
11 The original lifestyle data were aggregated to postal code-6 level, which means that this dataset 
provided information about the average characteristics of about twenty persons.  
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The question was put forward by Bart, a member of the innovation platform that 
supported the pilot. In response to Juriaan’s question, Bart, Anna, Liesbet and Mieke 
all shook their heads.  
 Crime, Juriaan argued, is too serious a topic to flyer for if one can only expect 
the numbers to range from ten to twenty persons. Moreover, they could not even be 
certain about the actual relation between the young suspects and the lifestyle data, as 
explained above. Juriaan furthermore rejected the detective logic; in the case of the 
Burgcity pilot, the results were not reliable enough to justify a visit to the darts club 
(Interview April 13, 2012).  
 
 
Zooming out  
 
In the final meeting, Juriaan and his senior colleague Frank argued that lifestyle 
analysis was not a feasible option. Nevertheless, Frank suggested changing to a 
“helicopter perspective”. He advised to acquire data about young suspects in other 
cities. Youth from similar neighbourhoods in different cities, in terms of income 
similarities, for instance, could be grouped together and compared to other types of 
neighbourhoods. More variety between neighbourhoods and larger numbers would 
benefit the analysis and lead to statistically significant results: “to uncover the real 
processes on a micro level, one needs more material for comparison” (Fieldwork 
notes, September 26, 2011). Once a pattern was found for a general type of 
neighbourhood, it could be applied to Molendistrict neighbourhoods. It follows that to 
zoom in, they would first need to ‘zoom out’.  
 The reasoning here seems surprisingly similar to what Data Inc. and 
Burgcity’s policy makers had earlier referred to as ‘general social science’. With this, 
they referred to national statistics and criminological theory, as well as knowledge of 
a more universal kind (not specifically tailored to the neighbourhood). This was the 
type of knowledge that “should inform policy”, Frank argued.  
 Data Inc. seemed to have decided that the regime of evidence suitable for 
policy should be based on large numbers and statistical significance. Ironically, this 
was exactly the type of analysis that Data Inc. had promised to avoid at the outset of 
the pilot when it proposed formulating ‘local theories’. Anna therefore argued against 
Data Inc.’s new suggestion, claiming that this type of analysis lacks specificity. For 
instance, it overlooked the fact that Molendistrict does not have sufficient facilities for 
youth between twelve and eighteen years of age. With that, the pilot meetings came to 
an end and Data Inc. commenced writing the end report.  
 
 
Problem Youth 
 
At the outset of the paper I proposed that by zooming in with data mining one does 
not obtain a more detailed view of the same object. Rather, zooming in brings a new 
object into being. In Burgcity, profiles of problem youth were never stabilized, that is, 
accepted by all participants and included in the end report as an outcome of the pilot 
study. Yet, we observed several tentative profiles in this case study. In the first 
instance of zooming in described in this chapter, for example, problem youth were 
evoked with crime statistics and physical and spatial neighbourhood characteristics, 
such as the presence of swimming pools. Later on, we learned how problem youth 
came into being by assembling more general categories and aggregates, such as weak 
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neighbourhoods and city youth. When Data Inc. suggested zooming out, problem 
youth were related to youth in similar neighbourhoods in other cities; they became 
part of a national trend.  
 A particularly contentious issue is how corporate data and methods affect 
government policies. The ways in which corporations categorize and differentiate in 
order to increase profits may be at par with egalitarianism and the provision of social 
justice as principles of government (Gandy 2007). I will further elaborate on the 
profiles of problem youth that were created in Burgcity with this issue in mind. First, I 
discuss the use of pre-set Experian lifestyle profiles. Next, I discuss the profiles in 
terms of their regimes of evidence. 
 The Experian lifestyle profiles played an important role in this case study. The 
application of consumer profiles was expected to reveal a more personalized and 
closer view of youth. Problem youths would be consumers, to be identified by their 
media usage or their parents’ cars. Yet, the profiles did not always seem to easily fit 
into a crime control environment, as is illustrated by the following fieldwork 
fragment. A local police officer attended part of an interactive meeting at Anna’s 
invitation. She suggested how the Experian categories might be used:  
 
Police officer: Well, I think you can learn from this [the Experian data]. Those 
“quiet radio listeners” will be very annoyed by kids playing soccer outside, 
and they will surely call the city or the police and say: “I can’t hear the radio 
because of the noise.”  
 
Liesbet: I think you should see this as a marketing profile (…) It is a 
characteristic of the neighbourhood, where residents use the radio more often 
than the internet. (Fieldwork notes April 26, 2013) 
 
“Quiet radio listeners” refers to an Experian profile. Here it was used to learn about 
the types of people that file complaints with the police and the city about youth. The 
short dialogue illustrates how marketing profiles can be used to explain and predict 
behaviour. The profile’s name invited connotations about a certain type of person: 
quiet and peaceful (see also Curry 2004). 
 The fragment also indicates that practitioners do not necessarily accept the 
categories they are presented with. Liesbet argued that these profiles are tailored to 
marketing usage, not to understand other types of behaviour – let alone those of 
problem youth. Marketing variables and categories with less obvious titles, however, 
may be more easily integrated into government practice. In another meeting, for 
instance, Liesbet argued that persons in the category of “two times average income 
and self-employed” complain more often and insist that the government should solve 
their problem (Fieldwork notes, April 21, 2013).  
 With regard to the regimes of evidence that were applied, we learn two things 
about corporate intervention. The first is that Data Inc. approached problem youth as 
an information problem, thereby justifying the collection of more data (Schinkel 
2009). It argued for the collection of more data as it aspired to a universal truth value 
in the guise of large numbers and statistical significance.  
 Second, we should nevertheless be careful in assuming that marketing 
methods simply ‘contaminate’ government practices. With regard to the regime of 
evidence, Data Inc. decided that a more ‘traditional’ social science analysis on the 
basis of more cases would be more suitable for local government. It was therefore 
Data Inc. that reified the ethics of government intervention. In Data Inc.’s view, a 
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local government cannot deal lightly with the issue of youth crime. Juriaan and Frank 
emphasized the city’s responsibility for careful and effective action in the field of 
youth crime policy. Burgcity, in contrast, was rethinking its own role in marketing 
terms, as a ‘communicative government’. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
My interest in this chapter was in how a digital identity of problem youth was created 
according to the rationale of zooming in. When brought into practice, I argued, this 
metaphor suggests that digital representations of youth have a high truth status. It 
therefore justifies the collection of ever more data and the use of profiles. I set out to 
challenge zooming in as a data mining metaphor by showing how it was done in 
practice and by drawing out the norms that were embedded in and produced through 
this work.  
 The Burgcity case shows the limitations of the metaphor. It had one obvious 
limitation: there simply were not enough registered suspects in a neighbourhood to 
perform an analysis on. Yet, this did not discourage the analysts; Data Inc. argued that 
simply more data were needed.  
 I demonstrated, moreover, that data mining is not a practice based solely on 
digital data. Far from a smooth and technical operation, data mining was a situated 
practice. I identified two modes of situated improvisation: evocation and comparison. 
These were conducted by the interplay of screens, professional knowledges, paper 
maps, local politics and regimes of evidence. By relating these heterogeneous entities, 
one does not acquire a better view of a smaller part of the same object, but a new 
object of intervention is brought into being. In this case, problem youth shifted from 
relations between categories of administrative everyday knowledge and objects in the 
neighbourhood, such as swimming pools, to relations between youth from comparable 
neighbourhood in different cities.  
 We learn about several normativities that were part of zooming in. First, 
results needed to be made relevant as surprises. Useful knowledge was unexpected 
knowledge. Yet, the results could not be too unexpected because data mining results 
needed to be made tellable. Furthermore, surprise depended on difference: local 
problem youth needed to be distinguished from the problem youth in the larger 
geographical area they are part of, such as a city or district. This requirement also 
produced a norm: local problem youth is invariably constituted as a deviation, and the 
city or the district as the norm.  
 Second, zooming in had a focus: useful knowledge was knowledge at the level 
of the neighbourhood. This had a consequence for problem youth: they were taken to 
‘be where they lived’ (Curry 2003). Because crime policy is focused on 
neighbourhoods in Burgcity, categories of good and bad neighbourhoods already 
existed. These labels were easily transferred to the young suspects living in them.  
 Third, as the previous remark also indicates: zooming in depended on the 
application of more general categories and aggregated data. Problem youth identities 
only became more particular by assembling generalities. The categories and 
knowledges that were applied were normatively laden themselves: they told of good 
and bad neighbourhoods, and they were mobilized in relation to local policy 
discussions about facilities (as these might attract youth from ‘weak 
neighbourhoods’). Furthermore, standardized profiles were introduced from the 
domain of marketing, thereby equating problem youth identities with consumer 
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identities. In this pilot, however, these profiles did not stabilize. It also needs to be 
noted that the policy makers did not accept every standardized profile.   
 Fourth, establishing a closer look depended on decisions about what counts as 
good evidence for policy practice. Two regimes of evidence were introduced into 
Burgcity’s policy practice: a detective regime and a marketing regime. The marketing 
regime was appealed most to because it related to the idea of local government as a 
‘communicative government’. Data Inc., however, decided that government 
intervention needs a more ‘scientific basis’. Intervention on the basis of small 
numbers would not be effective or justifiable. In this case, a corporation reified what 
it thought of as the ethics of government intervention. 
 If anything, these findings point out that improving the use of data mining for 
a better view of problem youth involves not only decisions about which digital data to 
use and how much. Producing knowledge about problem youth that can inform a fair 
policy practice will include rethinking the issues above. At the very least, it involves 
rethinking the relation of policy knowledge to social science and the corporate sector.  
 To conclude, a range of metaphors circulates digital identification practices 
such as data mining. Aside from zooming in, actors use ‘connecting the dots’ 
(Amoore and De Goede, 2008), ‘deep knowledge’, and ‘obscured knowledge hidden 
in the data’. These metaphors, I suggest, help perform the seemingly endless 
analytical possibilities of these technologies. We need to attend to them as situated 
practices in order to change the terms by which digital identities are produced. 
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